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Afghanistan suffers from a sharply deteriorating security situation. This is mainly due to the 
massive return of the Taliban and the expanding activities of Islamic State (IS) and other 
Jihadist groups which led to a tremendous increase in terrorist attacks leading to an 
extraordinarily high level of civilian casualties. On July 23, Kabul was ones again rocked by a 
major terrorist attack. Afghanistan capital city experienced a twin explosion which hit a large, 
demonstration of tens of thousands of the Hazara minority, killing at least 80 people and 
wounding hundreds of others. IS claimed responsibility for the suicide attack which was 
carried out by two of its fighters.    
 
This attack marks the first major IS attack in Kabul. In order to shed light on causes and 
consequences, the terror strike must be seen in the context of several factors:   
 
Firstly, there is the proximity of time to the decision of US President Barack Obama to draw 
down troops ‘only’ to 8,400 by the end of his administration. This is much more than 
envisaged in the initial plan to maintain a force level of 5,500 soldiers in Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, the combat troops were entrusted again with an offensive mandate with the clear 
mission to fight terrorism and to support the Afghan government. After the official 
withdrawal of most of the international combat troops from Afghanistan in 2014, this is, 
without a doubt, a new dimension in the latest US military strategy in the country. Primarily, 
this has to be seen as Washington’s reaction of the territorial gains of the Taliban as well as 
the rise of Islamic State and Al Qaeda activities in the country. In operational terms, 
transferring more power to the top commander (currently General John Nicholson) means that 
the US troops in Afghanistan will be entrusted with more flexibility helping to maximize use 
of available capacities, reacting faster towards potential upcoming and ongoing threats. 
However, the decision of maintaining not only troops but even more than expected and 
entrusted with a robust mandate to fight Islamist terror groups must be identified as a 
‘motivation’ for Taliban, Al Qaeda and especially Islamic State to intensify their activities.     
 
Secondly, ISIS has a history of attacking Hazara – not only in Syria and Iraq but in 
Afghanistan too (like the beheading of 7 Hazara in the Zabul province)- and it is obvious 
that the terror group wants to enforce the already entrenched sectarianism between the 
minority of the Hazara Shiites and the Sunni majority in the country. Sectarian violence, or 
mainly the Shi‘a–Sunni divide, is already a serious challenge facing the government in 
Kabul. Differences between these two sects of Islam can be traced back to the succession 
issue after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD. In the Af-Pak region, this 
cleavage mainly surfaced in the early 1980s when mostly Sunni Islamic radical groups 
received funding from the USA and Saudi Arabia to fight the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Concurrently, the Shi‘a Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran promoted Shi‘a radicalism in the 
region, resulting in the formation of numerous organization to safeguard Shia’s interests. 
Iranian support for Shi‘a elements in Pakistan, and the mostly Sunni Afghan jihad against the 
‘Red Army’, encouraged Sunni extremism, supported by an emerging anti-Iranian block in 
the Muslim world. International proponents of this proxy war provided political, financial, 
and ideological support to their respective factions. Latter phenomenon led to a further 
increase of Sunni as well as Shia militant groups in order to conduct subversive activities such 
as targeted killings, mosque bombings and suicide attacks against the rival community. One 
Pakistan-based Sunni terror group, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, carried out an attack against 
Hazara’s in December 2011, killing more than 55 people in Kabul during the Shi'ite festival 
of Ashura. This was the deadliest action against Shias until last Saturday. Attempts by the 
Afghan government to counter sectarianism have mostly proven ineffective, partly because 
sectarian groups have themselves been used for political purposes (especially during by the 
administration of former Afghan President Hamid Karzai) and also because socio-economic 
factors such as high unemployment and the unequal distribution of wealth continue to 
contribute to frustration and intolerance within the Hazara community. The latter one is 
gaining importance since the IS are achieving two goals: On one side the attack will create 
further rifts between the different religious communities, on the other side it produces 
tensions between Hazara with the central government.   
 
Thirdly, despite the Iran nuclear deal framework, general mistrust between Tehran and 
Washington will remain, this will also include suspicions regarding ongoing Iran’s role and 
activities in Afghan domestic politics. There are concerns, that the newly attack on the Hazara 
community might provoke a reaction from Tehran. Basically one must state, that Iran is 
increasingly gaining importance in the whole region. Some analysts even argue that Shia Iran 
is the real beneficiary of the US/NATO military engagements in Afghanistan since it was 
weakening -at least temporarily- the Sunni Afghan Taliban, a major regional adversary which 
were seen as threats to Iran's political and socio-cultural existence. Due to the disastrous 
post-invasion periods in Afghanistan producing a tremendous power vacuum paving the way 
for Iran to extend its activities and influence in Afghanistan. As such, the growing Sunni 
terrorism and especially the advent of the IS in Afghanistan might be used by Tehran to 
actively safeguard its interests in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the resurgence of the Taliban and 
the extent of IS influence is reawakening Tehran’s threat perception of an encirclement of 
Iran by a potential ‘Sunni wall’ (Iraq-Pakistan-Afghanistan). In consequence, one should 
rather expect a stronger role of Iran in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs.   
 
Fourthly, the two blasts among peaceful demonstrators is an apparent attempt to undermine 
Afghanistan’s civil society, to enforce social and economic inequality in order to produce 
frustration among disadvantaged communities. As such, terror incident must be also seen as 
an attack on people attempts to exercise their fundamental political rights and subsequently a 
strike against Afghanistan’s process of democratic transition. The Hazara, the third-largest 
minority with estimated 9 percent of the population in Afghanistan, were protesting against 
the change of the route of the so-called the TUTAP transnational electricity project. The 
latter one is an initiative by the Asian Development Bank involving five countries: 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the initial plan of 
the route incorporates the Bamiyan province, was most of the Hazara settlements are located. 
In consequence, the changes in the project implementation are increasingly perceived as the 
continuation of the suppression of the Hazara’s. the people are disenchanted about the 
democratic and economic performance of the country. Those in control of Afghanistan 
since October 2001, namely the US-backed Kabul elite, have failed to establish an inclusive, 
legitimate and accountable political system. Instead the country’s democratic transition and 
state-building process were featured by the return of autocratic, decentralised warlord rule, 
high level of tolerance for impunity regarding war crimes, pervasive corruption, torture and 
other human rights’ violations as well as the exclusion or marginalization of certain, 
disadvantaged communities.1 Especially the corrupt and nepotistic governments of former 
President Hamid Karzai truncated and violated any notions and fundamental principles 
of ‘liberal democracy’. Additionally, the remarkable uncertainty and heightened risk of 
tensions over the election period in 2014 convinced many refugees not to return to 
Afghanistan and were an incentive for people inside the country to leave .   
 
Fifthly, the latest terror attack must be contextualized within the tensed Afghanistan-Pakistan 
relations. More concrete, Kabul is blaming its eastern neighbor for providing safe havens to 
terrorists operating in Afghanistan. This follows the rationale of observers stating that most 
acts of terrorism in Afghanistan carry the Pakistani paw print. Therefore, it does not come by 
surprise that Afghan President Ashraf Ghani states that “having state-to-state ties with the 
neighboring country a "bigger challenge" for his government than combating terror groups 
such as al-Qaeda and Taliban”.   
 
Sixthly, as a predominantly Sunni terror group, IS is, like the Taliban, opposed to Shiites 
and does not recognize them as Muslims. Nevertheless, the Taliban immediately rejected any 
involvement in the terror attack and stand aloof from IS. This is once again emphasizing the 
growing power struggle between both Jihadi groups in Afghanistan. In this context, besides its 
resurgence, one must be aware that the since the death of the Taliban’s spiritual leader Mullah 
Muhammad Omar, the militant movement experienced changes in leadership, internal power 
struggles, and severe rifts. In other words, the Taliban movement was or still is in a deep 
identity crisis. Being disenchanted about the future course, goals and strategies, it seems 
obviously that several Taliban fighters were defecting to IS - in search of a new, strong 
leadership and a clear ideological orientation, they are getting increasingly attracted by IS 
Consequently, conducting major, successful terror attacks might help to win over more 
Taliban fighter and other Jihadists. Here, IS will introduce a new quality of brutality and 
violence which is until today largely unknown in Afghanistan. In order to be able to ‘keep up’ 
with the aggressive forward policy of IS, local terrorist groups might be forced to escalate 
their activities. In result, the situation will once more turn from ‘bad to worse’ finding its 
expression in more terror attacks, consequent counter-terror campaigns and a continuation of 
the exodus of Afghans towards Europe. 
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